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CASE COMMENT
TELECOMMUNICATIONS: THE APPLICABILITY OF THE WIRE
FRAUD STATUTE TO PROSECUTIONS OF SCHEMES AIMED AT
A FOREIGN SOVEREIGN
Pasquantinov. UnitedStates, 125 S. Ct. 1766 (2005)
JoannaA. Wasiluk*
I. FACTS
The defendants, U.S. citizens, smuggled large quantities of liquor from
the United States into Canada' without paying the required excise taxes.2
The U.S. Government alleged that they committed federal wire fraud by
using interstate wires3 to effect a "scheme or artifice to defraud" in
violation of the wire fraud statute.4 Defendants appealed following their
conviction in the district court.5 They argued that the common law revenue
rule,6 which bars the courts of one country from enforcing another
* J.D. expected May 2007, University of Florida Levin College of Law; B.A. 2004, Duke
University. This Comment is dedicated to my parents, Andrew and Izabela, and to my fiancd, Mike
White, for their continued love and support.
1. Pasquantino v. United States, 125 S. Ct. 1766, 1770 (2005).
2. Id. At that time, Canada's taxes on imported liquor amounted to double the liquor's
purchase price. Id. The defendants would avoid paying the taxes by hiding the liquor in their cars
and driving it over the Canadian border without declaring it to the Canadian customs officials. Id.
3. Id. The defendants, while in New York, used the telephone to order liquor from discount
package stores in Maryland. Id.
4. The wire fraud statute provides:

Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice to defraud,
or for obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses,
representations, or promises, transmits or causes to be transmitted by means of
wire, radio, or television communication in interstate or foreign commerce, any
writings, signs, signals, pictures, or sounds for the purpose of executing such
scheme or artifice, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 20
years, or both....
18 U.S.C. § 1343 (2005).
5. Pasquantino,125 S.Ct. at 1770.
6. Id. at 1775. The common law revenue rule was based on an analogy between foreign
revenue laws and foreign penal laws. Id. A general rule exists against the enforcement of foreign
penal statutes. Id. at 1774. It derives from a principle that crimes can only be prosecuted in the
country in which they were committed. Id.As Chief Justice Marshall explained, "'[t]he Courts of
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country's tax laws, prevented prosecution of this case because it would
require the court to recognize the revenue laws of Canada The Fourth
Circuit affirmed their convictions8 and the Supreme Court of the United
States9 HELD, that scheme to defraud a foreign government of tax revenue
violates the wire fraud statute as the plain terms of the statute criminalize
such a scheme and the revenue rule does not bar this prosecution.'0
II. HISTORY

The U.S. Courts of Appeals have disagreed over whether such a
scheme to defraud a foreign government of tax revenue can violate the
wire fraud statute." The main issues facing the courts have been
determining the extent of the statute's reach and the breadth of the revenue
rule.
The First Circuit Court of Appeals in UnitedStates v. Boots 2 held that
such foreign tax frauds were beyond the reach of the wire fraud statute. 3
In Boots, three defendants were involved in a scheme in which they
utilized the telecommunication wires to import tobacco into Canada
without paying the required taxes. 4 The First Circuit reversed their
convictions for wire fraud.'" In so ruling, the court looked beyond the plain
language of the statute and considered the international implications that
a conviction may have. ' Consistent with the revenue rule, the court
reasoned that foreign governments' revenue laws should not be subjected

no country execute the penal laws of another."' Pasquantino,125 S. Ct. at 1774 (quoting The
Antelope, 10 Wheat. 66, 123, 6 L. Ed. 268 (1825)). Courts have treated the revenue rule as a
corollary to this principle. Id. at 1775.
7. Id.at 1770.
8. Id.at 1771. The Fourth Circuit panel first agreed with the defendants and reversed their
convictions; however, upon a rehearing en banc, the court vacated the panel's decision and affirmed
the convictions. Id.
9. Id.
10. Pasquantino,125 S.Ct. at 1770.
11. CompareUnited States v. Boots, 80 F.3d 580 (1996), with United States v. Trapilo, 130
F.3d 547 (1997).
12. 80 F.3d 580 (1996).
13. Id. at 589.
14. Id. at 583. The government presented evidence that telephone communications were
made to further the scheme. Id. at 585.
15. Id. at 589.
16. Id. at 587.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol18/iss2/8

2

Wasiluk: Telecommunications: The Applicability of the Wire Fraud Statute t

CASE COMMENT

to intrusive scrutiny by U.S. courts.'7 Rather, because of their potential for
stirring up foreign relations issues, 8 the court concluded that matters
arousing such international implications are better handled by the
executive and legislative branches of government. 9
However, in United States v. Trapilo," the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals expressly rejected the First Circuit's decision in Boots.2 ' In
Trapilo, the defendants plotted to smuggle liquor' into Canada without
paying the required excise taxes.23 In accordance with Boots, the district
court granted their motion to dismiss the indictment for wire fraud.24 The
government, on appeal, argued that contrary to the reasoning in Boots, the
statute condemned "any scheme" to defraud that utilized U.S.
telecommunications systems, and did not require an inquiry into the
validity of the foreign government's tax laws.25 The Second Circuit
agreed.

26

The Trapilo court noted that the plain language of the statute clearly
punished "any scheme" to defraud27 and that the statute's language neither
expressly nor impliedly precluded a prosecution to defraud a foreign
government of tax revenue.28 Relying on the premise that "[w]here there

17. Boots, 80 F.3d at 587. The court reasoned that upholding this wire fraud conviction would
amount to passing on the validity of Canadian revenue laws. Id. Because the object of the scheme
was a violation of Canadian tax laws, in order to prove that a scheme to defraud existed, the court
would have to examine Canadian law to determine whether a violation was intended and in fact
occurred. Id. In making such a determination, the court would have to judge the validity of
defendants' challenges to these laws or allegations of not having violated them. Id.
18. Id. at 587. The court reasoned that enforcement of foreign tax frauds is inevitably
intertwined with the enforcement of the foreign sovereign's own laws and policies, ones that this
country may not necessarily be sympathetic to but ones over which this country has no authority.
Id.
19. Id. at 588. The court explained that although it does not question Canadian laws in
particular, the courts are not empowered to make such country-by-country assessments of potential
for foreign relations conflicts. Id. The criminality of conduct should not be left to prosecutorial
discretion, with the expectation that prosecutions based on schemes aimed at hostile countries will
not be pursued. Id. Rather, the judiciary should abstain from such determinations and leave them
to the executive and legislative braches. Id.
20. 130 F.3d 547 (1997).
21. Id.at551.
22. Id. at 549. The defendants allegedly ordered large amounts of liquor through telephone
calls, facsimiles and wire transmissions. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 550.
25. Trapilo, 130 F.3d at 551.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
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court declined to engage in discussions of the statute's potential
international implications. ° Further, the Court noted that all the
prosecution was required to show was a scheme, an intent to defraud, and
the use of wire communications in its furtherance." It was immaterial what
form the scheme would take, what its ultimate purpose or who its victim
was, and what law it intended to violate.3" Thus, because the statute's focus

was the misuse of wires rather than the validity of foreign revenue laws,
the Trapilocourt found that an assessment of the validity of Canadian laws
was at no point necessary and the revenue rule not implicated. 3
Ill. INSTANT CASE

In Pasquantino v. United States,34 the Supreme Court resolved the
conflict between the courts of appeals by holding that a scheme to defraud

a foreign government of tax revenue violates the wire fraud statute.35 The
Court agreed with the Second Circuit's reasoning in Trapilothat the plain
terms of the statute criminalized such conduct,3" and that the common law
revenue rule did not bar the prosecution.3" However, over the dissent's

29. Id."'The case must be a strong one indeed, which would justifya Court in departing from
the plain meaning of words... in search of an intention which the words themselves did not
suggest."' Id. (quoting United States v. Wiltberger, 18 U.S. 76, 95-96 (1820)).
30. Trapilo, 130 F.3d at 551.
31. Id.at 552. See Durland v. United States, 161 U.S. 306,313 (explaining that the wire fraud
statute punishes the scheme, not its success). See also Gregory v. United States, 253 F.2d 104, 109
(stating that the wire fraud statute only condemns the forming of the scheme to defraud, whatever
form it may take, and the use of wire communications in its furtherance). These cases illustrate that
both the success of the scheme and the identity of the victim are irrelevant; all that is proscribed
is the use of U.S. telecommunications systems to promote a scheme through which one intends to
defraud another of property. Trapilo, 130 F.3d at 552.
32. Trapilo, 130 F.3d at 551.
33. Id. at 552.
34. 125 S. Ct. 1766 (2005).
35. Id. at 1770.
36. Id. at 1771. The Court reasoned that the scheme in question satisfied both ofthe elements
of the wire fraud statute that the defendants disputed in this case: that they engaged in a "scheme
to defraud" and that the object of the scheme was "property". Id. First, their plot was a "scheme to
defraud" Canada because the defendants routinely brought liquor into Canada while failing to
disclose it on customs forms. Id. at 1772. Second, the right of Canada to collect taxes constituted
"property" within the meaning of the statute because depriving Canada of such a valuable
possession resulted in economic injury. Id. Thus, the broad language of the statute authorized this
prosecution. Id. at 1771.
37. Id. at 1779.
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objection, the Supreme Court stressed that such an application of the wire
fraud statute did not give it extraterritorial effect. 8
The Court concluded that the revenue rule did not bar this
prosecution. 9 By examining the early revenue rule cases, the Supreme
Court found that the original purpose of the rule was to prohibit the
collection of tax obligations of foreign countries.'4 However, the Court
noted that the instant action was just a criminal prosecution designed to
punish domestic conduct.4 The enforcement of foreign revenue laws was
simply an incidental by-product and indirect effect,42 and the Court found
no cases that barred such an action.43 Because the extent to which the
revenue rule barred indirect recognition of foreign revenue laws was
unsettled at the time the wire fraud statute was enacted," the Court
concluded that Congress could have reasonably thought that the courts
would enforce the statute even if doing so would result in incidental
recognition of foreign revenue laws.4"
Additionally, the Supreme Court reasoned that this prosecution did not
contravene the purposes behind the revenue rule" as it posed little risk of
the main evil that the rule was created to guard against: judicial evaluation
of foreign governments' revenue policies.47 This action had been brought

38. Id. at 1780.
39. Pasquantino,125 S. Ct. at 1774.
40. Id. at 1775. The Court found that the first cases implementing the revenue rule prohibited
the enforcement of one country's tax liabilities in the courts of another country. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 1776. "An action by a domestic sovereign enforces the sovereign's own penal law.
A prohibition on the enforcement offoreign penal law does not plainly prevent the Government
from enforcing a domestic criminal law. Such an extension, to our knowledge, is
unprecedented... ." Id.
43. Id. at 1777. The main object in cases defendants cited was to collect money to pay foreign

tax claims. Id.
44. Pasquantino,125 S. Ct. at 1778. The wire fraud statute was enacted in 1952. Id.

45. Id.
46. Id. at 1779.
47. Id. As Judge Hand stated:
[W]hen it concerns the relations between the foreign state and its own citizens...
To pass upon the provisions for the public order of another state is, or at any rate
should be, beyond the powers of a court; it involves the relations between the
states themselves, with which courts are incompetent to deal, and which are
intrusted to other authorities.

Id. (quoting Moore v. Mitchell, 30 F.2d 600, 604 (2d Cir. 1929)).
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by the Executive' to enforce a statute passed by the legislature; thus,
although it would require a recognition of foreign laws to determine
whether domestic laws had been violated, the Supreme Court decided that
these branches must have concluded that the dangers of causing
international friction in this instance were low.49 In a deferential stance, the
Court noted that it did not have the authority to evaluate such foreign
policy concerns.50
Despite this broad reading of the wire fraud statute, the Supreme Court
stressed that such an application did not give it extraterritorial effect;
rather, it insisted that only domestic conduct was at issue.5 The Court
reasoned that because "[tihe wire fraud statute punishes [only] the scheme
and not its success,"52 the offense was completed at the moment the
scheme was executed inside the United States.53 Thus, the application of
this statute was entirely domestic. 4
The dissent,55 however, characterized the majority's opinion as
applying an "exorbitant scope to the wire fraud statute" 6 and giving it
extraterritorial effect."7 The dissent admonished the majority for
disregarding the presumption against extraterritoriality in determining the

48. Id.at 1779. The Executive is "'the sole organ of the federal government in the field of
international relations'" and has ample authority and competence to manage 'the relations between
the foreign state and its own citizens' and to avoid 'embarrass[ing] its neighbor[s]."' Id. (citation
omitted) (quoting Moore, 30 F.2d at 604).
49. Id. at 1779. The Court assumed that by choosing to prosecute, the Executive had assessed
the impact that such a prosecution would have on U.S.-Canadian relations. Id.
50. Pasquantino,125 F.3d at 1779.
51. Id. at 1780.
52. Id. (quoting United States v. Pierce, 224 F.3d 158, 166 (2d Cir. 2000)).
53. Id.
54. Id. at 1781. The Court noted that in any event, this was not a statute in which Congress
was concerned with only domestic issues because the language of the statute punishes frauds
executed in "interstate or foreign commerce." See 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (2005).
55. Justice Ginsburg, with whom Justice Breyer joins, and Justice Scalia and Justice Souter
join as to Parts II and III. Pasquantino,125 F.3d at 1781.
56. Id. at 1782. The dissent noted that the Court has previously recognized that an "incautious
reading of the statute could dramatically expand the reach of federal criminal law, [and has] refused
to apply the proscription exorbitantly." Id. at 1784. See McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350,
360 (refusing the extension of the counterpart mail fraud statute to reach corruption in local
government); see also Cleveland v. United States, 531 U.S. 12, 24-25 (holding that the wire fraud
statute does not reach plots to falsify information on state license applications).
57. Pasquantino,125 S.Ct. at 1784 ("Construing § 1343 to encompass violations of foreign
revenue laws, the [majority] ignores the absence of anything signaling Congress's intent to give the
statute such an extraordinary extraterritorial effect.").
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scope and interpretation of a statute,"8 absent anything to signal Congress's
contrary intent. 9 The dissent further noted that this prosecution implicated
the revenue rule directly: it reasoned that the only aspect of the defendants'
conduct that was criminal in the United States was the purpose to evade
Canadian tax laws.' Thus, the effect of the prosecution's charge was that
another country's revenue laws had been violated and that the wire fraud
statute would be used to enforce such foreign laws." Accordingly,
convictions could not have been obtained without proof of the defendants'
intent to violate Canadian revenue laws. 2 The dissent found such a
reliance on Canadian laws illustrative of the impropriety of this
prosecution.
IV. ANALYSIS
The U.S. Courts of Appeals have struggled over the question of
whether the wire fraud statute applies to schemes aimed at defrauding a

foreign government of tax revenue. 3 At issue has been the significance of
the foreign entity and whether its introduction requires a modified reading
of the wire fraud statute in order to avoid violating the well-established
common law revenue rule." However, the Supreme Court, rather than
addressing this issue, dispelled of it by finding the revenue rule
inapplicable to this prosecution and thus the foreign entity of little
significance."5 Two broad principles shaped the Court's holding.

58. Id. at 1785. Unless otherwise indicated, Congress intends its statutes to have domestic,
not extraterritorial, application. Id.
59. Id. The Court explained that Congress has not given any indication of its intent to give
this statute extraterritorial application. Id. It reasoned that when Congress intends its statutes to
have extraterritorial reach, it is capable of conveying such a choice. Id.; see 16 U.S.C. §
3372(aX2)(A) (2005) (prohibiting transportation of wildlife that has been "taken, possessed,
transported, or sold in violation of any.. . foreign law"). Thus, congressional silence does not equal
Executive or Judicial discretion; rather a presumption against extraterritoriality applies.
Pasquantino, 125 S. Ct. at 1785.
60. Pasquantino,125 S. Ct. at 1786.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 1783 (Ginsburg, J. & Breyer, J., dissenting). See United States v. Pierce, 244 F.3d
158, 166-168 (2d Cir. 2000) (explaining that ifno Canadian duty tax existed, defendants would not
have been guilty of wire fraud).
63. See United States v. Boots, 80 F.3d 580, 588 (1996); cf. United States v. Trapilo, 130
F.3d 547, 551 (1997).
64. Boots, 80 F.3d at 588.
65. Pasquantino,125 S.Ct. at 1779.
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A. ProtectingUS. 's Right of Domestic Enforcement
The holding in the instant case hinges on the Court's determination that
this prosecution regulates primarily domestic conduct." The Supreme
Court agreed with Trapilo that the heart of the prosecution concerns the
misuse of U.S. wires, rather than the validity of Canadian revenue laws.6
The Court reasoned that the purpose of the statute was to punish the
misuse of U.S. telecommunications systems and that any enforcement of
Canadian revenue laws was purely incidental.s
The Supreme Court agreed with the dissent and the First Circuit Court
of Appeals in Boots that the basis for this prosecution was the defendants'
"scheme to defraud" Canadian tax law;69 however, the Court disagreed
with what it perceived to be the implications of this finding. Both the
dissent and the First Circuit focused on the fact that proof of the intent to
defraud would require judicial interpretations and evaluationsof Canadian
tax law70 and because such an inquiry would violate the revenue rule, they
concluded that this prosecution should be barred. 7 However, the Supreme
Court sided with the Second Circuit in Trapiloand found that although this
prosecution would require an incidental recognition of Canadian law, the
sole conduct being punished was the intent and the scheme itself,
regardless of the likelihood of its success or the identity of the victim. 72
Thus, since the scheme was concocted wholly within the United States, the
application of the statute was entirely domestic rather than extraterritorial,
and the revenue rule was never directly implicated.73
66. Id. at 1776, 1777, 1780.
67. Trapilo, 130 F.3d at 552; Pasquantino,125 S. Ct. at 1777. The Court considered-this to
be an action that "had as its primary object the deterrence and punishment of fraudulent conduct-a
substantial domestic regulatory interest entirely independent of foreign tax enforcement." Id.
68. Pasquantino,125 S. Ct. at 1777 ("[T]he link between this prosecution and foreign tax

collection is incidental and attenuated at best.... .
69. Id. at 1780.
70. Id. at 1783 ("The defendants' convictions for wire fraud therefore resulted from, and

could not have been obtained without proof of, their intent to violate Canadian revenue laws.");
United States v. Boots, 80 F.3d 580,587 (1996) ("The scheme to defraud at issue-proof of which

is essential to conviction-had as its sole object the violation of Canadian revenue laws. To convict,
therefore, the district court and this court must determine whether a violation of Canadian tax laws
was intended and, to the extent implemented, occurred. In so ruling, our courts would have to pass

on defendants' challenges to such laws and any claims not to have violated or intended to violate
them.").
71. Pasquantino,125 S. Ct. at 1788; Boots, 80 F.3d at 588 (Ginsburg, J., Breyer, J., Scalia,
J., & Souter, J., dissenting).
72. Pasquantino,125 S. Ct. at 1780. ("Theiroffense was complete the moment they executed
the scheme inside the United States .
.

73. Id.
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B. JudicialDeference in ForeignPolicy Matters
One of the few issues that the First and Second Circuits agreed on was
the principle of judicial non-interference in foreign policy matters.74
However, in arguing deference to the legislative and executive branches,
the courts came up with opposite conclusions regarding the propriety of
this wire fraud prosecution. The Boots court found that because this
prosecution would require an examination of foreign revenue laws, the
executive and legislative foreign policy power would be impaired by the
courts' involvement.' In contrast, the Trapilo court found that because no
ambiguity existed in the legislative language, the court should not search
for an intent that the words did not suggest.76 Thus, the prosecution should
proceed since it simply involved the application of the language as the
legislature unambiguously drafted it."
The Supreme Court elevated the contest over the deferentiality to an
even higher level. It followed Trapilo's reasoning because it refused to
apply its own interpretation to what it perceived as seemingly
unambiguous language of the legislature.78 However, the Supreme Court
went a step further. It reasoned that the court's refusal to allow such a
prosecution would actually frustrate both the legislature and the executive:
since the action was based on a statute passed by the legislature and the
prosecution was pursued by the executive branch, these branches had
74. Boots, 80 F.3d at 587-88 ("Ofparticular concern is the principle of noninterference by
the federal courts in the legislative and executive branches' exercise of their foreign policymaking
powers."); United States v. Trapilo, 130 F.3d 547, 553 (1997) ("The simple fact that the scheme
to defraud involves a foreign sovereign's revenue laws does not draw our inquiry into forbidden
waters reserved exclusively to the legislative and the executive branches of our government.").
75. Boots, 80 F.3d at 588 ("National policy judgments made pursuant to [the legislative and
executive branches' foreign policymaking power] could be undermined if federal courts were to
give general effect to wire fraud prosecutions for schemes of this type aimed at violating the
revenue laws of any country.").
76. Trapilo, 130 F.3d at 551. The court stated:
The intention of the legislature is to be collected from the words they employ.
Where there is no ambiguity in the words, there is no room for construction. The
case must be a strong one indeed, which would justify a Court in departing from
the plain meaning of words.., in search of an intention which the words
themselves did not suggest.
Id. (quoting United States v. Wiltberger, 18 U.S. 76, 95-96, 5 L. Ed. 37 (1820)).
77. Id. at 553 ("Our goal is simply to vindicate the intended purpose of the statute....
78. Pasquantino, 125 S. Ct. at 1170 C'[T]he plain terms of § 1343 criminalize such a
scheme....-).
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already made their determinations of foreign policy and must have
concluded that such a prosecution would not create international friction.79
The Supreme Court found that courts have "neither aptitude, facilities nor
responsibility" to evaluate foreign policy concerns stemming from the
revenue rule and that judicial intervention would simply contravene the
legislative and executive purpose. 0 Thus, following the principle of
judicial non-interference in matters of foreign policy, the Supreme Court
permitted this wire fraud prosecution.
V. CONCLUSION

The courts' contradictory reactions to the wire fraud statute in response
to the foreign entity element show the uncertainty that exists in the law
with regards to the potential extraterritorial application of U.S. statutes.
The courts are justifiably reluctant in giving our laws extraterritorial
effect; however, as the Supreme Court suggested, these courts are
sometimes too willing to attribute such an effect to any action that
implicates a foreign sovereign.8 As the Court demonstrated, a careful
scrutiny of the statutory language may reveal that a prosecution that
initially appears to have extraterritorial application is actually entirely
domestic in character.82

79. Id. at 1779.
80. Id. ("The greater danger, in fact, would lie in our judging this prosecution barred based
on the foreign policy concerns animating the revenue rule, concerns that we have 'neither aptitude,
facilities nor responsibility' to evaluate.").
81. Id. at 1780.
82. Id.
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